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5Revisiting the Secular 
Multiple Secularities and Pathways to Modernity1
1 Introduction
For the last few decades, sociological debates about religion and secularisa-
tion have been characterised by confrontation between (often American) 
critics and (mostly European) defenders of secularisation theories. There 
has also been a remarkable rise in academic and public debates about the 
role of secularism in political regimes and in national as well as civilisa-
tional frameworks. These debates are shaped by the context of the changing 
position of the West in world politics, Islamist terror and the war on ter-
ror, struggles of religious minorities for recognition and influence, and the 
concomitant negotiations over the place of religion in the public sphere, 
as well as the emergence of post-national citizenship. Contributions from 
political theory, social anthropology and religious studies that emerged 
from this context have enriched the debate, but also contributed to frag-
menting existing theories on the relationship between religion and mo-
dernity. Whereas scholars previously aimed to develop ‘general theories’ 
of secularisation that included deviations from the general model, newer 
approaches tend to highlight the specificity of Western European develop-
ments as opposed to those in the rest of the world, and sometimes even 
highlight their incomparability. 
Meanwhile, critical approaches in the study of secularism that follow 
Foucauldian genealogical methodology, as especially promoted by Talal 
Asad2 and his followers, have become something like a new mainstream 
in research on secularism. Such approaches seem to only allow the study 
of secular-religious distinctions as the outcome of colonial impositions of 
secular-religious divides of European origin, and with them their related 
theoretical concepts. From that perspective, it seems coherent to conclude 
that secular-religious distinctions are ‘alien’ to Non-European contexts and 
to favour holistic notions of Islam or Hinduism as ‘ways of life’. However, 
in many respects we consider this – perhaps unintended – consequence of 
1 This paper is a revised (partly expanded, partly shortened) version of an earlier article 
that appeared in Comparative Sociology in 2012 (Monika Wohlrab-Sahr, and Marian 
Burchardt (2012), “Multiple Secularities: Toward a Cultural Sociology of Secular Mo-
dernities,” Comparative Sociology 11/ 6.
2 Talal Asad (2003), Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, modernity. (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press).
6approaches that started out as ‘critical’, a dead-end street for the social sci-
entific study of religion. The basic premise underlying studies of secularisa-
tion, namely the search for the boundaries of religion and for their origin, 
as well as for the distinctions and differentiations between religion and its 
conceptual and institutional opposites3, is at risk of being ‘thrown out with 
the bathwater’ of classical secularisation theory. Against that backdrop, this 
article presents the conceptual framework of ‘multiple secularities’ with a 
view to refocusing sociological research on religion and its other. We sug-
gest that this framework stimulates new ways of theorising the relation-
ship between religion and secularity not only in the modern West, but also 
before modernity and beyond the West.4 In order to make visible what we 
regard as the foundational effect of secular dynamics, namely the social 
construction of the boundaries of religion, we pursue a strictly analytical 
understanding of secularity. This social construction is the outcome of 
contestations over the ways in which religion is culturally defined, socially 
and legally delimited, politically regulated and spatially as well as tempo-
rally arranged. Such analytic understanding does not prevent us from ana-
lysing the empirical normativity of such boundary drawing. Empirically, 
secularity is not a neutral issue, but bears normative imprints.5 Therefore, 
we conceptualise ‘secularity’ not only in terms of the making of conceptual 
distinctions and the institutionalisation of differentiation between religion 
and other societal spheres and practices, but also in terms of the cultural 
meanings underlying these distinctions and differentiations. Building on 
Max Weber, we distinguish between four basic ideal-types of secularity 
3 In this article, we distinguish – thanks to a suggestion by Philip Clart – between con-
ceptual distinctions (between the secular and the religious, for example) and practical, 
especially institutionalised differentiations. Which forms and terminology they may exist 
in, and in which relation they stand to each other, is an empirical question.
4 This article draws upon several research contexts. The concept of Multiple Secularities 
was originally developed in a research project with the same title at the Leipzig Univer-
sity (2011−2012), funded by the Saxon Ministry of Culture and Fine Arts. In the mean-
time, an interdisciplinary Humanities Centre for Advanced Studies Multiple Secularities: 
Beyond the West, Beyond Modernities has commenced work at the Leipzig University, 
exploring the applicability of the concept on pre-modern societies such as pre-modern 
Japan (Kleine, Christoph (2013), “Religion and the Secular in Premodern Japan from 
the Viewpoint of Systems Theory,” Journal of Religion in Japan 2/1: 1–34). The Centre 
is funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG), and its directors are Christoph 
Kleine and Monika Wohlrab-Sahr. For further information, see: http://www.multiple-
secularities.de.
5 Monika Wohlrab-Sahr (2011), “Multiple secularities and their normativity as an empiri-
cal subject: The Immanent Frame.” 9 September 2017, last accessed. http://blogs.ssrc.org/
tif/2011/12/13/multiple-secularities-and-their-normativity-as-an-empirical-subject.
7that are related to specific reference problems and associated with specific 
guiding ideas. 
2 Religion, secularisation, and modernity
Over the past few decades, sociological debates have problematised long-
cherished assumptions of process theories in the social sciences, stimulat-
ed revisions and given rise to new approaches. This concerns the classical 
version of modernisation theory, with its assumptions regarding conver-
gence and diffusion, as well as the theory of secularisation, which assumes 
that the worldwide spread of the concepts of the nation state, parliamen-
tary democracy, the rule of law, the liberal market economy, and rational 
science would give rise to a similar model of social organisation, in which 
religion would be largely confined to the private domain. In addition, it 
seemed obvious that an increase in the economic standard of living and 
in existential security would go hand in hand with a reduction in religious 
participation and belief.6 Although these ‘classical’ variants of modernisa-
tion theory have not disappeared from the scene and can still claim a cer-
tain degree of plausibility, they have nevertheless lost the dominant status 
they once enjoyed.
A wide-ranging debate over classical modernisation theory was con-
ducted among social scientists as well as historians.7 Within this contro-
versy, the long-dominant position of the convergence theorists is increas-
ingly being superseded by approaches that assume different developmental 
paths as a permanent feature; these include authors who had initially pro-
ceeded on the basis of strong convergence assumptions.8 The new orienta-
tion has found prominent expression in the debate over ‘multiple moderni-
ties’. This approach defends a minimal, unifying concept of modernity but 
simultaneously recognises the enduring diversity of developmental paths.9 
The divergence of historical pathways is assumed to be an outcome of dif-
ferent Axial Age cultures as well as of particular histories of interaction 
and encounters with the Western concept of modernity.10 It was the rapid 
6 Ronald Inglehart (1997), Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic and 
Political Change in 43 Societies (Princeton: Princeton University Press).
7 Peter Wagner (2001), Theorising modernity: Inescapability and Attainability in Social 
Theory (London: Sage); Wolfgang Knöbl (2007), Die Kontingenz der Moderne: Wege in 
Europa, Asien und Amerika (Frankfurt am Main, New York: Campus). 
8 Ronald Inglehart, and E. W. Baker (2000), “Modernization, Cultural Change, and the Persis-
tence of Traditional Values,” American Sociological Review 65: 19–51.
9 Shmuel N. Eisenstadt (2000), „Multiple Modernities,“ Daedalus 129: 1–29.
10 Jóhann P. Árnason, Shmuel N. Eisenstadt and Björn Wittrock, eds. (2005), Axial Civiliza-
8economic and political rise of the ‘Asian tiger’ economies (Singapore, Hong 
Kong, South Korea), as well as China, India, and Brazil, in particular, that 
contributed to the belated recognition of the modernity of these societies 
by (Western) sociology and unsettled the hitherto prevalent identification 
of modernity with Western civilisation.   
However, these developments have led only a few authors to reject the 
concept of modernity altogether. A parallel development can be observed 
in the discussion regarding secularisation. Although here attempts were 
made from early on to identify different paths of secularisation, these 
were initially motivated by the intention to develop a ‘general theory of 
secularisation’11 and establish the conditions for exceptions to the gener-
al model. In the meantime, however, scholars of secularisation have also 
become aware of enduring differences12 and have emphasised the need to 
historicise the secularisation debate.13 In a different strand of the debate, 
the paradigm of secularisation was increasingly interpreted as a modern 
myth (principally inspired by the West) that, like the classical modernisa-
tion theory, is based on cultural biases and is unsuited to analyses beyond 
the Western world.14 It was argued that there were forms of modernity that 
can dispense not only with democracy and a liberal market economy but 
also with secularisation.
Concerns regarding the variety of secularisation were condensed by Casa-
nova15 into a fundamental critique of the theoretical idea that three rather 
distinct sub-theses – functional differentiation, the decline of subjective 
religiosity, and the privatisation of religion – are necessarily linked. While 
Casanova initially still regarded functional differentiation as an indispen-
sable component of secularisation, in his more recent work he has increas-
ingly characterised this, too, as a genuinely Western development in the 
light of European history and its confrontations between temporal and 
tions and World History (Leiden: Brill).
11 David Martin (1978), A General Theory of Secularization (Oxford: Blackwell).
12 David Martin (2005), On Secularization: Towards a Revised General Theory (Aldershot: 
Ashgate); Philip S. Gorski, and Ateş Altınordu (2008), “After Secularization?”, Annual Re-
view of Sociology 34: 55–85. 
13 Philip S. Gorski (2000), “Historicizing the secularization debate: Church, state and so-
ciety in late medieval and early modern Europe, ca. 1300−1700,” American Sociological 
Review 65: 138–67.
14 One of the first to speak of secularisation as a ‘myth’ of modern societies within the con-
text of European sociology of religion was Thomas Luckmann (1980), “Säkularisierung 
– ein moderner Mythos,” in Lebenswelt und Gesellschaft: Grundstrukturen und geschichtli-
che Wandlungen (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh).
15 José Casanova (1994), Public Religions in the Modern World (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press).
9sacred authority, and has questioned its relevance for other regions and 
religions.16
In his book ‘A Secular Age’17, Charles Taylor takes the critique further 
by arguing that secularisation theories have mainly been ‘subtraction sto-
ries’, based on the idea that secularisation unfolds as the liberation from 
earlier forms of knowledge whereby human nature is ultimately revealed. 
Like Casanova, Taylor distinguishes between secularity as the retreat of 
religion from public space and as the decline of beliefs, but ultimately fo-
cuses on secularity as a change in the ‘conditions of belief ’18 in terms of 
the emergence of exclusive humanism. Taylor is aware of and supports the 
idea of multiple modernities, stressing that “secularity, like other features 
of ‘modernity’[,] […] find[s] rather different expression, and develop[s] 
under the pressure of different demands and aspirations in different 
civilizations.”19 But he self-consciously limits his analysis to the internal 
transformations of Christendom whereby belief in God is perceived as one 
option among others. While Taylor employs a unified idea of ‘the West’, 
others have limited the geographical validity of secularisation theory even 
further through the concept of ‘European exceptionalism’.20 
In recent years, empirical analyses have been increasingly shifting to-
ward comparisons between ’secularisms’21, i.e. the institutionalised and le-
gally codified relationships between politics and religion, based on some 
kind of separation between the two spheres. In the case of Europe, for 
example, a distinction is made between formal establishment combined 
with pluralism (as in Great Britain), a cooperation model (as in Germa-
ny), and strict separation (as in the case of French laïcité).22 Other studies 
16 José Casanova (2008), “Public religions revisited,” in Religion:  Beyond a Concept. Ed. 
Hent de Vries (New York: Fordham University Press), 101–19.
17 Charles Taylor (2007), A Secular Age (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press), 22.
18 Ibid., 12.
19 Ibid., 21.
20 Peter L. Berger (1999), The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and 
World Politics (Washington DC: Ethics and Public Policy Center); Peter L.Berger, 
Grace Davie, and Effie Fokas, eds. (2008), Religious America, Secular Europe? ATheme 
and Variations (Aldershot: Ashgate).
21 Linell E. Cady, and Elizabeth S. Hurd (2010), “Comparative Secularisms and the Politics 
of Modernity: An Introduction,” in Comparative Secularisms in a Global Age. Ed. Linell E. 
Cady, and Elizabeth S. Hurd (New York: Palgrave Macmillan), 3–24.
22 Matthias Koenig (2007), “Europäisierung von Religionspolitik: Zur institutionellen Um-
welt der Anerkennungskämpfe muslimischer Migranten,” in Konfliktfeld Islam in Europa. 
Ed. Monika Wohlrab-Sahr, and Levent Tezcan. Special issue, Soziale Welt 17: 347–68.
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distinguish between assertive and passive secularisms,23 represented, for 
instance, by France and Turkey, on the one side, and by the United States 
on the other. Overall, however, the literature on secularism does not dis-
tinguish institutional separation systematically from the accompanying 
ideologies. Accordingly, secularism is often viewed primarily from the per-
spective of the critique of ideology.24 
This has become especially influential in the work of Talal Asad25, who 
has focused his research on secularism on the genealogy of the secular-
religious divide, which – in a process of co-constitution – produces religion 
and the secular at the same time. As this divide originates in the Chris-
tian hemisphere and has been imposed on non-Christian environments, 
mainly in the course of colonial encounters and processes of nation state 
formation, it is – according to this school of thought – inextricably linked 
to power and violence. While welcoming the attempt to trace back the his-
tory of concepts and its implications, we think that this approach bears the 
risk of insinuating that there was nothing similar to secular-religious dis-
tinctions and differentiations in non-Western contexts before the advent of 
Western modernity. It therefore de facto fosters holistic notions of the non-
Western, non-Christian world. Secularity is then the original sin which 
brings divide into the wholeness. The power and violence linked to politics 
that draw on such notions of wholeness and ‘way of life’, as for instance in 
the Hindutva movement or radical Islamism, are then either ignored or 
interpreted as defensive reactions against colonialism.
The critique of classical secularisation theory can be condensed into 
three fundamental objections. These concern (a) its alleged universalism, 
(b) its underlying process theory, and (c) its modernist normative bias. 
Overall, however, these critiques themselves are highly normative. While 
the secularisation paradigm is often considered to be Eurocentric and anti-
religious, recent research generally fashions itself as sympathetic toward 
religion.26 At times, the studies evoke the impression of a ‘natural’ religios-
23 Ahmet T. Kuru (2009), Secularism and State Policies toward Religion: The United States, 
France, and Turkey (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press).
24 Tariq Modood (2010), “Moderate Secularism, Religion as Identity and Respect for Re-
ligion,” The Political Quarterly 81/1: 4–14; Saba Mahmood (2006), “Secularism, Herme-
neutics, and Empire: The Politics of Islamic Reformation,” Public Culture 18/2: 323–47; 
Veit, Bader (2007), Secularism or Democracy? Associational Governance of Religious Di-
versity (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press). 
25 Asad (2003), Formations of the Secular.
26 An exception is the book by Susan Jacoby (2004), Freethinkers: A history of American 
Secularism (New York: Metropolitan Books) in which the history of American secular-
ism is related as the history of a liberation movement and of its coalition with religious 
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ity among the population and of an ideological secularism founded on an 
alliance between political and academic elites. Compared to the older de-
bate, recent contributions often engender an inversion of the subject and 
object of the critique: Whereas secularism used to be regarded as a means 
of liberation from the constraints of traditional and religious authority, re-
ligion now appears as a space of freedom, and secularism as an instrument 
of regimentation and of exclusion. The heightened awareness of secular-
ism’s articulation of power relationships and knowledge regimes, and its 
selective authorisation of forms of religious subjectivity and expression 
that are compatible with liberal modernity, is significant. However, such 
an awareness becomes flawed when it downplays the role of the autonomy 
associated with modernity and secularity, compared to that of moments 
of domination, as well as when it defines modernity in a manner that ex-
cludes religious freedom.
The critique of secularisation theory has certainly increased sensitivity 
to cultural differences and unjustified generalisations. However, there is 
now a danger of an essentialism of historically and culturally ‘unique’ con-
stellations and undue generalisations about the ideological power of West-
ern secularism. Given this situation, we think that the discussion of secu-
larisation in sociology could be profitably linked to recent debates in the 
theory of modernity, in particular to the ‘multiple modernities’ approach 
and to the perspectives of cultural sociology. The ‘multiple modernities’ 
approach insists on the indispensability of the concept of modernity, but 
without persisting in its one-sided orientation to a seemingly universalistic 
Western model. Focusing on the intertwinements of universality and dif-
ference, it contends that all modern societies have been confronted with 
the European model. These confrontations and their interpretations, how-
ever, reflect specific – in Eisenstadt’s terminology ‘civilisational’ – histories. 
As a consequence, the results have differences that cannot sufficiently be 
explained by processes of diffusion and convergence. 
This also implies that variations across time and space in how the religious-
secular divide is understood and justified cannot be reduced to structural 
and institutional dimensions. Against the tendency to construe this divide 
mainly in terms of relationships between church and state, we suggest that 
cultural sociology, with its insistence on the ineluctable embeddedness 
of action in horizons of affect and meaning,27 can offer new insights into 
dissenters – for example, in the controversies over the American Constitution.
27 Jeffrey Alexander, and Philip Smith (2002), “The Strong Program in Cultural Theory: El-
ements of a Structural Hermeneutics,” in Handbook of Sociological Theory. Ed. Jonathan 
H. Turner (Boston: Springer Science), 136; Thomas Schmidt-Lux, Monika Wohlrab-Sahr, 
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the endurance of variations and the persistency with which they are de-
fended. This is not meant to substitute institutional approaches. Rather, 
we consider institutional regulations to be one expression of ‘cultures of 
secularity’. We suggest the conceptualisation of both dimensions by asking 
which societal reference problems the development of different forms of 
secularity responds to and what solution the different forms of secularity 
offer for these problems.
3  Multiple Secularities: The concept
3.1 Conceptual clarifications: Secularity, secularism,  
secularisation
The dominant concepts in the current international debate are secularisa-
tion and secularism. Until now, the concept of secularity has only seldom 
featured centrally.28 Whereas the concept of secularisation is used primar-
ily in sociological process models addressing processes of functional differ-
entiation, religious decline, and privatisation of religious practice, secular-
ism refers to the arrangements of the institutional separation of politics/the 
state and religion as well as to their ideological legitimisations. 
In what follows, we propose to reserve the concept of secularism for the 
ideological-philosophical programme – hence, for the explicit ideology of 
separation – and related political practices, and the concept of secularity, by 
contrast, for the cultural and symbolic distinctions, as well as institutionally 
anchored forms and arrangements of differentiation between religion and 
other social spheres. Following Asad29, we assume that both spheres are first 
identified as religious and secular domains in the course of their distinction 
and differentiation. We also assume that in many regions, however, the histo-
ry of such distinction and differentiation may have started much earlier than 
the use of the terminology of the secular suggests.30 It is an open empirical 
question as to when this originates and which terminology has been used to 
and Alexander Leistner (2016), eds., Kultursoziologie: Eine problemorientierte Einführung 
(Weinheim: Beltz), 29−48.
28 Asad (2003), Formations of the Secular; Taylor (2007), A Secular Age; Berger, Davie, and 
Fokas (2008), Religious America, Secular Europe?
29 Asad (2003), Formations of the Secular.
30 For Japan, see Christoph Kleine (2013), “Religion and the Secular in Premodern Japan 
from the Viewpoint of Systems Theory,” Journal of Religion in Japan 2/1: 1–34 and (2013), 
“Religion als begriffliches Konzept und soziales System im vormodernen Japan: Polythe-
tische Klassen, semantische und funktionale Äquivalente und strukturelle Analogien,” in 
Religion in Asien? Studien zur Anwendbarkeit des Religionsbegriffs. Ed. Peter Schalk et al. 
(Uppsala: Uppsala Universitet), 225–92.
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designate the areas and practices that have been distinguished.Secularisation 
signifies both the process of differentiation, including diminishing mutual 
influences between religion and other social domains, and the decline in re-
ligious participation and belief.31 
The concept of secularity is therefore more inclusive than that of secu-
larism and also encompasses the, at times latent, taken-for-granted forms 
of the distinction between the religious and the non-religious. In addition, 
we expressly do not confine analysis to the relationship between the state 
and religion but include other functional domains of society (for instance, 
those of law, education, science, business, etc.), as well as everyday life 
and the public sphere. The connections between such religious-secular 
distinctions and their legitimating guiding ideas differ case by case. One 
can assume that the corresponding divisions develop a special cultural dy-
namic where they are not only implicitly practised but are made explicit 
and become condensed into guiding ideas, as was also the case with the 
guiding ideas of modernity and progress or with the ‘social projections’32 
that went along with the introduction of new technologies, such as let-
terpress printing. Exploring secularity in terms of symbolic distinctions 
and institutional differentiations implies, of course, that religion and the 
non-religious are far from being completely separate, without any points 
of contact or mutual entanglements. Recent anthropological literature33 
sometimes mistakenly claims that secularisation theory propagated the 
complete separation of religion from other social spheres. This misunder-
standing obviously rests on the conflation of secularisation theory and the 
secularist self-image prevalent among various social groups in which con-
cepts of separation circulate as political ideologies. In contrast to such self-
images, sociological ideal-types always assume a variety of combinations 
of religion, national politics, and the claims of religious groups and secular 
agents carried into the public sphere. Secularity is then considered as a 
result of social conflicts34 or negotiation processes. Far from refuting the 
concept of the religious-secular divide, the entanglements of religion and 
31 Casanova (1994), Public Religions in the Modern World.
32 Michael Giesecke (2006), Der Buchdruck in der frühen Neuzeit: Eine historische Fallstudie 
über die Durchsetzung neuer Informations- und Kommunikationstechnologien. (Frankfurt 
am Main: Suhrkamp), 156.
33 Mahmood (2006),“Secularism, Hermeneutics, and Empire“.
34 Monika Wohlrab-Sahr, Thomas Schmidt-Lux, and Uta Karstein (2008), “Secularization 
as Conflict,” Social Compass 55/2: 127–39; Christian Smith (2003), “Introduction: Re-
thinking the secularization of American public life,” in The Secular Revolution: Power, 
interests, and conflict in the secularization of American public life. Ed. Christian Smith, 
(Berkeley: University of California Press) 1–95.
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politics must be viewed as areas in which the boundaries between religion 
and secular spheres are negotiated, challenged, and redrawn. For this reason, 
we agree with Casanova35 that the concepts of secularisation and secularity 
make sense “as an analytical framework for a comparative research agenda 
that aims to examine the historical transformations of all world religions un-
der conditions of modern structural differentiation.”
It also seems evident from this perspective that the rejection of concepts 
such as secularisation and secularism in large parts of the Islamic world is 
not necessarily bound up with the absence of differentiations between the 
religious and the secular, hence with the omnipresence of religion36. Our as-
sumption is rather that there are no readily accessible guiding ideas of secu-
larity with which such distinctions could be legitimised.37 In addition, Islam 
is also widely considered a cultural identity, especially in the Arab world with 
its history of belated nation-state formations. This blurring of the boundaries 
of religion and culture renders a positive articulation of secularity extremely 
difficult. Correspondingly, the most intransigent resistance to (Western) sec-
ularism is also articulated by Muslim groups active in the transnational are-
na. By contrast, secularity was part, though only at times, of the self-image of 
the more ‘robust’ nation-states, such as Syria or Iraq under the Baath regime. 
Here it must be stated, however, that especially among Iranian Muslim in-
tellectuals, some living abroad, some still in Iran, there have recently been 
strong contributions arguing for the limitation of the scope of religion. This 
limitation has variously concerned the autonomy of a democratic political 
sphere, the freedom of the individual, the independence of rationality from 
religion, or the autonomy of personal spiritual orientation independent of 
institutionalised religion.38 The term ‘secularity’ may be used or not in these 
35 José Casanova (2006), “Secularization Revisited: A Reply to Talal Asad,” in Powers of the 
Secular Modern: Talal Asad and his Interlocutors. Ed. David Scott and Charles Hirschkind 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press), 19.
36 See Schulze, Reinhard (2010), “Die Dritte Unterscheidung: Islam, Religion und Säku-
larität: Säkularität unter Muslimen,” in Religionen − Wahrheitsansprüche − Konflikte: 
Theologische Perspektiven. Edited by Walter Dietrich, and Wolfgang Lienemann (Zürich: 
TVZ). 147–206. 
37 Daniel Kinitz (2015), “Deviance as Phenomenon of Secularity: Islam and Deviants in 
Twentieth-century Egypt—A Search for Sociological Explanations,” in Multiple Seculari-
ties Beyond the West: Religion and Modernity in the Global Age. Ed. Marian Burchardt, 
Monika Wohlrab-Sahr, and Matthias Middell (Boston: De Gruyter), 97–119.
38 Soroush, Abdolkarim (2000), Reason, Freedom, and Democracy in Islam: Essential Wri-
tings of Abdolkarim Soroush. Ed. Mahmoud Sadri, and Ahmad Sadri (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press; Akbar Ganji (2008), The Road to Democracy in Iran (London: Bo-
ston Review Books); Mohammad M. Shabestari, and Jan Kuhlmann (2012), “Interview 
with Mohammad Mojtahed Shabestari: Why Islam and Democracy Go Well Together.” 
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writings, but the differentiation between religion and other societal spheres 
and practices is explicitly addressed, and notions of a privatised, spiritualised 
religiosity go along with such differentiation.
In many other cases, however, the history of the resonance between the 
Western and the Islamic world is reflected primarily in the negative rela-
tionship to a form of secularity perceived as ideological secularism which 
is associated with hostility to religion and atheism. This does not preclude, 
however, de facto differentiations in the areas of education, science, business, 
law, and politics, where these are often subordinated to references to Islam or 
the sharia. Therefore, we argue against a reading of Islamic societies which 
sees their path to secularisation (in particular to functional differentiation) 
as being obstructed primarily by intrinsic features of Islam. More relevant, 
it seems to us, is the interplay between religious-cultural particularity and 
histories of resonance whereby the possibilities of explicitly adopting secular 
ideas are undermined, as well as existing power relationships in the Islami-
cate world. We would therefore also argue against a holistic reading of Islam 
as a ‘way of life’, with regard to which the perspective of secularity is per se 
considered inapplicable.39 This holistic notion of Islam that perpetuates its 
indivisibility and sometimes even extends this to an anthropological concept 
of ‘homo Islamicus’ as opposed to ‘Western man’40, is not less ideological 
than modernist concepts of the inevitability of secularisation have been. The 
analytical distinction between ideologies of separation and practices of dif-
ferentiation also opens our eyes to pre-modern practices that provide intel-
lectual resources, and thereby pave the way for modern forms of secularity,41 
without themselves already being associated with secular guiding ideas. 
3.2 Paths of secularisation and varieties of secularism:  
Existing typologies
Although research on secularisation and secularism entails comparative 
methods and typologies, they represent only a minor part of the literature. 
https://en.qantara.de/content/interview-with-mohammad-mojtahed-shabestari-why-
islam-and-democracy-go-well-together, last accessed 1 June 2017; Laura Secor (2016), 
Children of Paradise: The Struggle for the Soul of Iran (New York: Riverhead Books).
39 John L. Esposito, and Azzam Tamimi (2000), Islam and Secularism in the Middle East 
(London: Hurst & Company).
40 Parvez S. Manzoor (2000), “Descralising Secularism,” in Islam and Secularism in the Mid-
dle East. Ed. John L. Esposito, and Azzam Tamimi (London: Hurst & Company), 96.
41 Rajeev Bhargava (2010), “The ‘Secular Ideal’ before Secularism: A Preliminary Sketch,” in 
Comparative Secularisms in a Global Age. Ed. Linell E. Cady, and Elizabeth S. Hurd (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan), 159–80; Kleine (2013), “Religion als begriffliches Konzept”.
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Comparisons between the United States and Europe or between different 
European societies have been the primary focus of attention to date in both 
the sociology of religion and historiography,42 with institutional arrange-
ments of the relationship between religion and the state being scrutinised as 
both independent and dependent variables.43 Koenig44 as well as Fetzer and 
Soper45 examine the importance of institutional arrangements for regimes 
incorporating religious minorities and challenges for principles of citizen-
ship.46 
The origins of such regimes are often explained, in turn, on the basis of 
specific historical dynamics, in particular the relationships between tem-
poral and religious rule in earlier historical phases, traditions of political 
thought, and the characteristics of the dominant religious traditions. Thus, 
in an attempt at sociological mapping, Martin47 differentiates models of re-
ligious monopoly, duopoly, and pluralism and specifies Protestant, Catho-
lic, and orthodox scenarios, respectively, which in turn undergo a variety 
of reconfigurations at the subnational level as regards the relationship be-
tween political-theological centres and peripheries. Similarly, Casanova48 
explores the differences between a Protestant, primarily Anglo-Saxon-Cal-
vinist path, and a French-Latin-Catholic path.
Demerath49 presents one of the few sociological typologies that is ex-
plicitly global in scope and also addresses dynamics of imperialism, colo-
nialism, and decolonisation in an incipient way. He differentiates between 
directed and undirected scenarios, and between internal and external 
sources of secularisation.
Whereas the above-mentioned approaches make efforts to connect so-
42 Hugh McLeod (2007), The Religious Crisis of the 1960s (Oxford, New York: Oxford Uni-
versity Press).
43 Berger, Fokas, and Davie (2008), Religious America, Secular Europe?; Rodney Stark, and 
Roger Finke (2000), Acts of Faith: Explaining the Human Side of Religion (Berkeley: Uni-
versity of California Press).
44 Koenig (2007), “Europäisierung von Religionspolitik”.
45 Joel S. Fetzer, and J. C. Soper (2005), Muslims and the State in Britain, France, and Germa-
ny. Cambridge studies in social theory, religion, and politics (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press).
46 The regimes are: formal establishment with simultaneous pluralism implemented at low thresh-
olds; corporatist cooperation between the state and religious actors; and laïcité.
47 Martin (1978), A General Theory of Secularization; Martin (2005), On Secularization: Towards 
a Revised General Theory.
48 José Casanova (2009), “The Secular and Secularisms,” Social Research 76/4 : 1049–66.
49 N. J. Demerath (2007), “Secularization and Sacralization Deconstructed and Recon-
structed,” in The SAGE Handbook of the Sociology of Religion. Ed. James A. Beckford, and 
N. J. Demerath (Los Angeles: Sage), 71.
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cial dynamics of secularisation with regimes of secularism, typologies from 
the field of comparative politics often have a more descriptive orientation 
and are restricted to institutional arrangements. Many approaches connect 
descriptive typologies with normative questions. Kuru50 compares ‘asser-
tive’ and ‘passive’ secularisms, whereas Modood51 – similarly – juxtaposes 
‘moderate’ and ‘radical’ secularisms. Stepan52 examines forms of ‘twin tol-
erations,’ by which he understands mutual concessions of autonomy on the 
part of religious and state actors. Taken as a whole, the achievement of this 
research tradition consists in bringing together a multitude of different state 
norms, discourses, and practices under the framework of models. However, 
its almost complete lack of attention to the everyday perspectives and the 
culturally saturated imaginaries of social groups imply that the cultures of 
secularity that develop under certain conditions beyond the reach of state 
guidelines are hardly addressed or are taken as mere effects of state policy. 
For the purposes of a cultural sociology of secularity, this cannot be suffi-
cient. When we talk of ‘cultures of secularity’, we refer to the meaning that 
is attached to the institutions, practices or discourses of differentiation and 
distinction with regard to religion.
Moreover, recent research has failed to construct ideal-types of secularity 
in Weber’s sense.53 Although Eisenstadt’s work on multiple modernities has 
identified numerous fault lines and antinomies, he did not condense them 
into ideal-types. 
3.3   From ‘multiple modernities’ to ‘multiple secularities’
While inspired by the idea of ‘multiple modernities’, our conceptualisation 
remains distinct from its strong ‘civilisational’ underpinning and its projec-
tions upon the ancient pasts of these civilisations.54 Research into multiple 
modernities has mostly tried to collect evidence on axial age cultures55 or 
50 Kuru (2009), Secularism and State Policies toward Religion.
51 Modood (2010), “Moderate Secularism, Religion as Identity and Respect for Religion”.
52 Alfred Stepan (2000), “Religion, Democracy, and the ‘Twin Tolerations’.” Journal of De-
mocracy 11/4: 37–57.
53 Max Weber (1985), “Die ‘Objektivität‘ sozialwissenschaftlicher und sozialpolitischer Er-
kenntnis,” in Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre. Ed. Johannes Winckelmann 
(Tübingen: Mohr).
54 Peter Wagner (2005), “Palomar’s Questions: The Axial Age Hypothesis, European Mo-
dernity and Historical Contingency,” in Axial Civilizations and World History. Ed. Jóhann 
P. Árnason, Shmuel N. Eisenstadt and Björn Wittrock (Leiden: Brill), 95.
55 Shmuel N. Eisenstadt (2002), “The First Multiple Modernities: Collective Identities, 
Public Spheres and Political Order in the Americas,” in Globality and Multiple Moderni-
ties: Comparative North American and Latin American perspectives. Ed. Luis Roniger, and 
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their non-axial counterparts56 and to elaborate on their consequences for 
the formation of collective identities.57 In general, Eisenstadt’s civilisational 
approach tends to identify the cultural foundations of collective identities 
rather than constructing ideal-types for the purpose of empirical compari-
son. It would be too strong an assumption, however, to identify the ‘cultures 
of secularity’ with collective identities based on ‘civilisations’. Moreover, the 
idea of ‘multiple secularities’ captures not simply a consequence of an ancient 
past, but the interplay of cultural histories and modern encounters. While 
being a core assumption of Eisenstadt’s work, studies building on him fo-
cus on past origins rather than on present interplays. With a view towards 
secularity, such interplays are key, in that at least the explicit public usage 
of secular-religious distinctions is hardly perceivable without some sort of 
encounter with European forms of modernity. Most of the studies on multi-
ple modernities remain highly abstract and their empirics and connections 
to present conflicts are rather vague. Against this backdrop, our goal is to 
enable the interpretation of recent conflicts by taking cultural histories and 
historic entanglements into account. 
However, there are important similarities between our ideal-types of 
secularity and Eisenstadt’s notion of Axial Age civilisations. One of the cen-
tral features of the latter is the emergence of strong notions of transcend-
ence and the separation of mundane and transcendental spheres.58 It should 
be emphasised that modern secular-religious distinctions fully depend on 
older differentiations between mundane and transcendent spheres, even if 
the former are generally more closely associated with the history of medi-
eval Christian Europe. More research is needed into the conditions under 
which Axial Age notions of transcendence feed into concepts of secular-
ity in the way suggested in this paper. Overall, we agree with the multiple 
modernities approach in its insistence on the plurality of cultural paths 
Carlos H. Waisman (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press), 7–28; Shmuel N. Eisenstadt (2005), 
“Axial civilizations and the Axial Age Reconsidered,” in Axial Civilizations and World His-
tory. Ed. Jóhann P. Árnason, Shmuel N. Eisenstadt and Björn Wittrock (Leiden: Brill), 531–
64; Kurt A. Raaflaub (2005), “Polis, ‘the Political’, and Political Thought: New Departures in 
Ancient Greece, c. 800−500 BCE,” in Axial Civilizations and World History. Ed. Jóhann P. 
Árnason, Shmuel N. Eisenstadt and Björn Wittrock (Leiden: Brill), 253–83.
56 Shmuel N. Eisenstadt (1996), Japanese Civilization: A Comparative View (Chicago: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press).
57 Shmuel N. Eisenstadt (1998), “The Construction of Collective Identities in Latin Amer-
ica: Beyond the European Nation-State Model,” in Constructing Collective Identities and 
Shaping Public Spheres:  Latin American Paths. Ed. Luis Roniger, and Mario Sznajder 
(Brighton: Sussex Academic Press), 245–63.
58 Björn Wittrock (2005), “Meaning of the Axial Age,” in Axial Civilizations and World His-
tory. Ed. Jóhann P.  Árnason, Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, and Björn Wittrock (Leiden: Brill), 66.
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into modernity and on the effects of a history of mutual entanglements in 
which the European modernity plays the role of a (positive or negative) 
point of reference. Both aspects are of specific importance for the issue of 
secularity. 
To sum up, what distinguishes the approach presented here from the 
ones mentioned above is that: (a) it attempts to develop ideal-types of secu-
larity in a way that supports work on concrete historical cases, while taking 
into account the distinction between these two tasks; (b) it seeks to over-
come the separation between processes of secularisation (religious decline 
and functional differentiation) and figures of secularity (configurations of 
cultural meaning); (c) it relates the figures of secularity back to historical 
processes of and conflicts over secularisation; (d) through its focus on the 
cultural meaning of secularity, it avoids a restriction to state policy; and (e) 
it aims at a comparative interpretation of current religious controversies 
against the background of the conflicts transmitted by cultural memory.
3.4  Some remarks on the use of ideal-types
Importantly, one must not conflate the differences between ideal-types in 
the Weberian sense and specific national or regional variations. Ideal-types 
are analytical abstractions that are developed from empirical and historical 
data and mirrored back on them to guide the construction of hypotheses and 
theorisation. ‘Real’ configurations will always differ from ideal-types, but the 
latter help to better examine the former. Our goal is therefore to develop an 
analytical framework that allows comparative analysis of social change in re-
gions, or nation-states or any other social formation. Thus, the construction 
of ideal-types is not an end in itself or an exercise in ‘pure theory’. Rather, it 
is a guide to empirical work. Some empirical configurations that are ana-
lysed and ‘compared’ with the ideal-typemay come closer to it than others. 
In some cases, competing or contradictory tendencies rather than a unifying 
strand may be revealed; and in others, comparisons with the ideal-typical 
distinctions may help to develop hypotheses on the non-existence of certain 
features and their consequences rather than to subsume them into one of 
the types. 
There are some limitations regarding the reach of our typology. Basical-
ly, it is not meant to comprehensively capture developments everywhere in 
the world. It is related to empirical cases where a ‘guiding idea’ of secularity, 
on which social groups can draw, was actually formulated. This implies that 
all the cases in which de facto differentiations between the religious and the 
secular exist, but remain implicit and are not expressed through guiding 
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ideas, are not directly included in the model. Simultaneously, however, we 
suggest that diverging configurations too can be fruitfully discussed on the 
basis of the model and its analytical distinctions. 
3.5  Multiple Secularities: problems and solutions
By ‘multiple secularities’, in what follows, we mean the forms of distinction 
and the institutionalisation of differentiations between the religious and other 
social domains (which are thereby marked as non-religious), that are, in part, 
legitimised through guiding ideas. We assume that these secularities exhibit 
different structures of meaning that document a specific social history of con-
flict no less than the competing influence of other forms of secularity. 
We assume further that the ‘multiple secularities’ that are taking shape in 
different countries and regions ‘respond’ to specific societal problems (as their 
reference problems) and offer solutions to them. Obviously, these problems 
arise at some point and in some form in many societies, but they arise with 
different degrees of urgency at different points in time. 
As a first approximation, we identify four such reference problems: (1) the 
problem of individual freedom vis-à-vis dominant social units, be they groups 
or the state; (2) the problem of religious heterogeneity and the resulting po-
tential or actual conflictuality; (3) the problem of social or national integra-
tion and development; and (4) the problem of the independent development 
of institutional domains. It is clear that most of these problems are closely as-
sociated with the formation of modern societies and states and the ideas on 
which they are founded, whereas the second, at least, also arises in pre-modern 
societies. It is no accident that reflections on pre-modern sources of modern 
secularity generally begin here. One might, however, also find variations of the 
other reference problems in pre-modern societies, like the strengthening of a 
centralised power.59 
It is clear that understandings and interpretations of such problems and 
solutions are often contested and, as a consequence, are collectively shared to 
varying degrees. What is considered a problem, for instance, with regard to 
nation-building and religious diversity, and a viable solution in terms of secu-
larity, is therefore subject to processes whereby interpretations of problems 
and solutions are negotiated and authorised. These processes of authorisation, 
in which the dominant social meanings of religion and secularity impinge on 
one another, are thus invariably embedded in power relationships defining the 
deep strata of historical experience in a given society and its religious and po-
59 Kleine (2013), “Religion als begriffliches Konzept”.
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litical tradition.
Processes of definition and framing involve a variety of social and political ac-
tors and social movements, often with antagonistic agendas. Typically, how-
ever, the reference problems, and the guiding ideas epitomising them, can be 
used as reference points for a variety of groups, even if these groups pursue 
competing goals in other respects. The reference problems and solutions men-
tioned above, together with their associated guiding ideas, may therefore de-
velop a binding social impetus, at least for certain historical periods, and there-
by become points of crystallisation for collective identities. As a consequence, 
we can see the emergence of more or less entrenched ‘cultures of secularity’, 
which are shared across otherwise existing lines of difference. The four central 
problems outlined above provide motives for institutionalising differentiations 
between the religious and other social spheres. As latent motives and social 
practices, they can certainly coexist, whereas, as overt motifs, they tend to 
compete with each other. Our assumption is, however, that given certain pre-
conditions, one of them will become dominant at least for a certain period by 
being aligned with guiding ideas that set the basic terms for distinguishing reli-
gious and secular spaces in a given society, and thereby push the other motives, 
at least at times, into the background. There is no doubt, however, that these 
motives are often highly contested. Accordingly, our claim is not that such a 
basic tenor of secularity can be identified in every society, or that just one of the 
motives matters. The following constellations may restrict such development: 
a) Practices of differentiation may remain below the threshold at which 
guiding ideas are formulated. An example of this would be (parts of) 
the Islamicate world.
b) Different concepts of secularity may coexist and find support from 
equally strong groups. This is likely to be the case in situations where 
the urge to find solutions for specific societal problems is not very 
strong. It may also be the case in situations where the need to form 
coalitions is stronger than anything else. Times of constitution-build-
ing could be an example of that.
c) Different concepts of secularity and guiding ideas may compete with 
each other. This situation seems to exist in a whole range of countries. 
It is especially visible in postcolonial countries, for example in South 
Africa, or in Western societies during phases of transition.60
d) The guiding idea can be the ideology of elites that diverges from the 
60 This was discussed in Cora Schuh, Marian Burchardt, and Monika Wohlrab-Sahr (2012), 
“Contested Secularities: Religious Minorities and Secular Progressivism in the Nether-
lands,” Journal of Religion in Europe 5: 349–83. With regard to the Netherlands, where we 
see a shift from secularity centred on the accommodation of groups to a model that centres 
on national development and societal integration.
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dominant social practices of differentiation, as with the secularist 
reforms of Kemal Atatürk, which today are patently in conflict 
with the Islamic self-understanding of parts of the Turkish popu-
lation and its present government. 
e) Finally, it is also possible that the problems in question are not ‘re-
solved’ in the direction of secularity but through the imposition 
of religious authority, such that secularity remains in the back-
ground as a latent option.
Even if the distinction between four basic types of secularity is an ideal-
typical construction that is not identical to reality, we assume that a basic 
cultural understanding of secularity can be identified in a whole range of 
societies, at least in certain periods. During ‘settled periods’61 this will re-
main latent but it will become manifest in periods of conflict. Such con-
flicts may be the expression of ‘critical junctures’ in Kuru’s62 sense and trig-
ger shifts in historical orientations.63 We have used the formula “secularity 
for the sake of…” to designate these basic patterns. At a first approxima-
tion, we distinguish between the following forms: (1) secularity for the 
sake of individual rights and liberties; (2) secularity for the sake of balanc-
ing/pacifying religious diversity; (3) secularity for the sake of societal or 
national integration and development; and (4) secularity for the sake of 
the independent development of functional domains of society. The iden-
tification of ideal-types is a process that shifts between the analysis of em-
pirical cases, the attempt to condense them into theoretical relationships, 
the theoretically informed return to empirical cases and so on.64 Thus, it 
follows the pattern of maximal and minimal comparison. To start with the 
reference problems of societal and national integration, and the problem 
of individual rights and liberties, both of which can be considered a cen-
tralised focus65, raises questions about the opposite, a decentralised focus, 
in our case the reference problem of balancing group diversity, but also the 
problem of the independent development of functional domains. A second 
61 Ann Swidler (1986), “Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies,” American Sociological 
Review 51/2: 278pp.
62 Kuru (2009), Secularism and State Policies toward Religion.
63 Kuru (2009), Secularism and State Policies toward Religion defined critical junctures as 
periods or moments in which both agency and structural conditions are available for 
systematic change.
64 In general, this comes close to the research strategy of the grounded theory methodology. 
Cf. Anselm L. Strauss (1987), Qualitative Analysis for Social Scientists (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press). 
65 While not being ‘centred’ in the same way as the concepts of societal integration or na-
tional development, ‘individual liberties’ has the potential to be a unifying principle, es-
pecially in contrast to ‘group rights’, which are  much more difficult to institutionalise and 
have a thrust that is de-centring rather than unifying.
23
comparative perspective concerns questions regarding the definition of the 
social that is inherent to the formulation of the reference problem. Here, 
we can differentiate between definitions of the social that are derived from 
the life-world domain of people and the community, and others that are 
derived from societal and institutional perspectives. Here, definitions of 
the social based on life-world perspectives, such as that of individual liber-
ties, may clash with ‘systemic’ definitions that are dominant in concepts of 
societal integration and national progress or the development of institu-
tional domains.
These four basic forms of secularity are associated with different guiding 
ideas: in the first type, it is the idea of freedom66 and individuality; in the 
second, that of toleration, respect and non-interference; whereas the third 
type involves the ideas of progress and enlightenment; and the fourth, fi-
nally, involves the guiding ideas of rationality, efficiency, and autonomy. 
This leads us to the following four-field matrix:
66 Of course, the notion of freedom can also become the guiding idea of national develop-
ment, the symbol of social progress and the preservation of social sovereignty. Examples 
of this can be found in the French Revolution, though also in the right-wing populist 
‘freedom parties,’ as, for example, in the Netherlands.
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We assume that the dominance of one reference problem tends to create 
tensions vis-à-vis the others not only in theoretical terms but also in the 
real world. For example, prioritising the balance between religious groups 
is likely to create tensions with regard to individual liberties, to the pursuit 
of national interests, as well as to guaranteeing the autonomy of functional 
domains. In a more abstract way, the emerging field of relationships and 
tensions can be depicted as follows: 
Individual                Groups
                                                 
4 Conclusions: Explaining secular hegemonies
What does it mean to say that a particular type of secularity becomes cul-
turally dominant? Across the world, secular collective identities and in-
stitutions are seen to be under pressure from religious revitalisations. As 
such, in countries such as India67, Armenia68, and Turkey69, religious na-
tionalism confronts secular nationalism and the secular state is also chal-
lenged, for instance with demands made by conservative Christians in the 
US and conservative Muslims in Europe.70 Again, however, we suggest that 
67 Peter van der Veer (1994), Religious Nationalism: Hindus and Muslims in India (Berkeley: 
University of California Press).
68 Marian Burchardt, and Hovhannes Hovhannisyan (2016), “Religious vs secular nation-
hood: ‘Multiple secularities’ in post-Soviet Armenia,” Social Compass 63/4: 427–43.
69 Yael Navaro-Yashin (2002), Faces of the State: Secularism and Public Life in Turkey 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press); Esra Özyürek (2006), Nostalgia for the Modern: 
State Secularism and Everyday Politics in Turkey. Politics, history, and culture (Durham: 
Duke University Press); Nilüfer Göle (2015), Islam and Secularity: The Future of Europe’s 
Public Sphere (Durham: Duke University Press).
70 Christian Joppke (2015), The Secular State Under Siege: Religion and Politics in Europe and 
America (Cambridge: Polity Press).
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it is useful to distinguish between secularism and secularity. The politi-
cal influence of the ideological programme of secularism may shift more 
or less quickly with new political parties coming to power. The cases of 
Turkey, Poland and Hungary show that religion-friendly political parties 
typically try to pass religion-friendly policies (especially if that is an es-
sential part of their political identity), and thus to change regimes of politi-
cal secularism. Such changes are often driven by nationalist parties which 
claim to represent the religious interests of the majority, and are typically 
inspired by the goal of reinforcing cultural homogeneity and hegemony. 
In other words, they aim to secure national unity not through institution-
alising secularity but a national religion. By contrast, in societies where 
secularism has been transformed into an element of national identity as 
in Quebec for instance,71 non-nationalist, pluralistically oriented parties 
are typically more religion-friendly and promote policies that give greater 
space to religious expression.
At the same time, however, the ways in which secularity is legally codified 
and anchored in constitutional law often prove to be relatively stable and 
independent from such political shifts.72 Courts may employ and promote 
the language of secularism as a democratic value, or shy away from it for 
reasons of political expediency, and, in both instances, defend the same le-
gal regulations of religion. Similarly, it is also clear that broader, culturally 
shared understandings of secularity are often disconnected from changes 
in the political regime of secularism. In other words, secularism and secu-
larity move in different historical rhythms. The notion of post-secularism, 
while useful as a philosophical concept to describe a changed awareness 
of the contemporaneity of religion and reason in liberal democracies,73 
has sometimes led scholars to conflate these differences. As Hjelm74 has 
argued, the new visibility of religion, in Europe and elsewhere, does not 
necessarily imply a new social significance of religion. New forms of reli-
gious diversity have certainly led scholars, politicians and intellectuals to 
question the adequacy of secularism as a regulatory political principle, but 
71 Marian Burchardt (2016), “Recalling modernity: How nationalist memories shape reli-
gious diversity in Quebec and Catalonia,” Nations and Nationalism 41/4: 1–21.
72 Matthias Koenig (2015), “Governance of Religious Diversity at the European Court of 
Human Rights,” in International Approaches to Governing Ethnic Diversity. Ed. Jane Boul-
den and Will Kymlicka (Oxford:  Oxford University Press), 51–78; Joppke (2015), The 
Secular State Under Siege.
73 Jürgen Habermas (2006), “Religion in the Public Sphere.” European Journal of Philosophy 
14/1: 1–25.
74 Titus Hjelm (2015), Is God back? Reconsidering the New Visibility of Religion (London, 
New York: Bloomsbury Publishing).
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this has not diminished but increased the analytical stakes of secularity.
Moreover, as argued before, cultures of secularity play out on different 
levels. Secularity is codified in law, discursively constructed in the public 
sphere, and a part of the cultural habitus of individuals as a set of disposi-
tions that shapes people’s perceptions, practices and sensibilities towards 
religion.75 Esra Özyürek76 has astutely shown how, in Turkey, the contrast 
between secularism as a state policy and discourse and secularity as a cul-
tural orientation was revealed through the ways in which politically dis-
empowered secular elites turned the secular into an ethics and aesthetics 
of personal, rather than public, life. Manifestations of secularity in public 
discourse and everyday life can be disconnected as well as entwined. The 
cultural norm not to adopt explicitly religious standpoints in a public de-
bate may be anchored in a liberal conception of the public sphere but it 
may also be anchored in, and be an expression of, the reduced social sig-
nificance of religion in a whole society. As a result of these observations, we 
make the following three propositions: 
(1) The ways in which manifestations of secularity are related to one 
another on different social levels – legal frameworks, the public 
sphere, cultural habitus – are contingent.
(2) It seems more likely that one particular type of secularity becomes 
culturally dominant in a given society if there is some degree of 
cultural resonance between these different manifestations.
(3) Such cultural resonances may develop even in culturally and re-
ligiously diverse societies if different social groups are jointly in-
vested in a ‘secular settlement’77, if only for divergent reasons.
By emphasising the fact that secularities emerge as cultural responses to 
historical problems around the management of religion, we also flag the 
differences between our use of the term ‘model’ or ‘type’ of secularity 
and the notion of ‘national models’ of citizenship, immigrant integration, 
church-state regimes or the governance of religion. Scholars participating 
in these debates have particularly criticised the use of such models as the 
independent variable to explain policy change and administrative practices 
around religion. They have argued that models are constantly changing78 
and that they are, in fact, the result of processes of contestation and ‘model-
75 Uta Karstein (2013), Konflikt um die symbolische Ordnung: Genese, Struktur und Ei-
gensinn des religiös-weltanschaulichen Feldes in der DDR (Würzburg: ERGON).
76 Özyürek (2006), Nostalgia for the Modern.
77 Damon Mayrl (2016), Secular Conversions: Political Institutions and Religious Education 
in the United States and Australia, 1800–2000 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
78 Bader (2007), Secularism or Democracy?
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ling practices’79. Significantly, as Bowen80 has shown, even French laïcité as 
the presumably neatest and most coherent model for governing religion81, 
is made up of an endless series of messy, often contradictory, norms and 
practices, which renders the idea of laïcité as a ‘national model’ question-
able. 
While we share this criticism of the use of concepts like ‘national 
models’, we already start from the assumption that historical formations 
of secularity are characterised by both civilisational cultures and multiple 
forms of transnational cultural encounter and cross-civilisational entan-
glement.82 The ideal-types of secularity described above are conceptual 
possibilities that are not solely framed within particular national tradi-
tions. We would argue that the messiness and contradictory orientations 
sociologists and anthropologists often find in studies of regulatory prac-
tices around religion can be explained as expressions of competing logics 
of secularity that exist side by side within the same national setting. Such 
competing logics of secularity inspire different kinds of practices that still 
cohere around certain guiding ideas such as individual freedom, respect or 
functional autonomy.
While it is generally a complex task to decide whether one type of secu-
larity is dominant, it is equally difficult to explain how and why certain 
types of secularity become dominant and hegemonic. While theories of 
social change broadly distinguish between incremental change and revolu-
tionary change, in his book ‘Secularism and State Policies Towards Religion: 
The United States, France and Turkey’, Ahmet Kuru proposes the notion of 
critical junctures as moments that trigger shifts in historical orientations. 
Kuru argues that a critical juncture is a moment when both agency and 
conditions are available for a systematic change.83 He builds on Capoccia 
and Kelemen84, who conceptualised critical junctures as periods in which 
“choices close off alternative options and lead to the establishment of insti-
tutions that generate self-reinforcing path-dependent processes.” Similarly, 
in his historical sociology of the secularisation of religious education poli-
79 Avi Astor (2014), “Religious Governance and the Accommodation of Islam in Contem-
porary Spain,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 40/11: 1716–35.
80 John R. Bowen (2007), Why the French Don’t Like Headscarves: Islam, the State, and Pub-
lic Space (Princeton: Princeton University Press).
81   Grace Davie (2000), Religion in Modern Europe: A Memory Mutates (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press).
82 See also Göle (2015), Islam and Secularity.
83 Kuru (2009), Secularism and State Policies toward Religion, 27.
84 Giovanni Capoccia, and R. D. Kelemen (2007), “The Study of Critical Junctures: Theory, 
Narrative, and Counterfactuals in Historical Institutionalism,” World Politics 59/3: 341.
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cies in the US and Australia, Damon Mayrl85 argued that in both countries, 
in several periods, processes of religious conflict and state-building led to 
the negotiation of historically new ‘secular settlements’. Finding that courts 
were central in American history, and traditional parliamentary processes 
in Australia, he suggests that these institutional avenues varied because 
“they were differently available to those political forces who were most ac-
tive in defining the terms of the new settlement” (ibid., p. 158). In addition, 
there is a renewed interest in social mechanisms understood as the relation 
and causal force that produce certain outcomes in a non-accidental fash-
ion. Gorski86 defined social mechanisms as the “emergent causal powers 
of entities within a system” and contrasted this concept with both the cul-
tural interpretation that reads history as sequences of events and positivist 
statistical correlations that treat mechanisms and historical causality as a 
‘black box’.
In our view, certain types of secularity may become hegemonic in soci-
ety if a particular perception and framing of the social problem secularity 
is meant to tackle (individual freedom, religious difference etc.) becomes 
hegemonic. And similarly, hegemonic types of secularity may shift in his-
tory when institutionalised framings of these problems are challenged, 
unmade and rearranged. Such historical shifts acquire a particular social 
traction and cultural force when they are condensed in guiding ideas that 
reorient and reinforce dynamics of secularisation. Finally, we suggest that 
some level of consensus about the desired outcome, whether enacted as 
a Gramscian hegemony or negotiated on the basis of diverging interests, 
increases the chances that particular types of secularity become institu-
tionalised and culturally anchored. All of this, however, needs in-depth 
empirical research that is both sociological and historical nature.
85 Mayrl (2016), Secular Conversions.
86 Philip Gorski (2009), “Social ‘mechanisms‘ and comparative-historical sociology: A criti-
cal realist proposal,” in Frontiers of Sociology. Ed. Peter Hedström, and Björn Wittrock 
(Leiden: Brill), 189.
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